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Abstract:   At the time of initiation, interest rate swaps are of zero market value to the
counterparties involved. However, as time passes, the market value of the swap position of
each counterpart may become positive or negative. These value changes are stochastic in
nature and are primarily driven by stochastic variations of the term structure of interest
rates. In this paper, we develop models for determining the market values and dynamic
interest rate risks of existing swap positions using the one-factor general equilibrium term
structure model of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985). The valuation and risk measurement
framework of this paper should be useful in developing a value turn risk accounting
method advocated by Merton and Bodie (1995) for better internal management and
reporting purposes and for more effective regulation.IN THE PAST TWO decades financial derivatives, including futures, options, and interest rate
and currency swaps, have become important and useful instruments in risk management for
financial institutions and business firms. After the recent reports of large losses by Proctor and
Gamble, Gibson Greetings, Metallgesellschaft, Orange County, and others, a great deal of
attention has been given to the discussions of the benefits and costs of financial derivatives. Since
their introduction in the early 1980’s, interest rate swaps have become one of the most powerful
and popular financial tools for transferring and hedging risk for banks and business corporations.
The market for interest rate swaps has grown very rapidly in the past fifteen years. As of the end
of 1994 the notional amount of outstanding interest rate swaps was more than $8.8 trillion
l. It is
notable that banks are now the major players in the market for interest rate swaps. For instance,
as of the end of 1992 the notional amount of outstanding interest rate swaps was $6.0 trillion,
and U.S. commercial banks alone held $2.1 trillion of interest rate swaps
2.
Interest rate swaps are simple financial contractual agreements between two parties. In a
plain vanilla fixed/floating interest rate swap, two counterparties exchange their interest
payments on the notional principal for a specified length of time. Using an interest swap, a firm
can easily create a synthetic liability that has a different maturity, different interest risk and
possibly a lower cost than existing liability alternatives to the firm
3. The growing popularity of
interest rate swaps is due in part to the fact that interest rate swaps are simple and easy to
execute and they are the relatively inexpensive instruments for hedging or for altering the interest
rate risk of a firm’s portfolio.
The U.S. commercial banks’ dominance in the swap markets has recently raised many
concerns about their swap transactions. These include the possibility of the failure of some large
banks in the swap market leading to the collapse of the payments and credit systems, known as
the systemic risk. Besides such dire consequences at the banking system level
4, the swap
1 Source: ISDA, see Risk, Vol. 8, No. 7, July 1995.
2 See Gorton and Rosen (1995).
3 See Loeys (1985), Bicksler and Chen (1986), Smith, Smithson, and Wakeman (1986), Turnbull
(1987), Arak, Estrella, Goodman, and Silver (1988), Wall (1989), Litzenberger (1992), and Titman
(1992) for discussions of motivation for interest rate swaps and their applications in hedging interest
rate risk and in asset/liability management.2
transactions of an individual bank or a business corporation also have important implications for
its shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders. Efforts are being made by various regulatory
and accounting overseeing agencies to better disclose and monitor the swap and other
derivatives related positions of their users. Many users themselves are also instituting internal
policies and mechanisms to closely track and manage their positions in the swap and other
derivative markets.
An important element for the success of any external or internal effort to better regulate,
disclose, or manage the derivatives positions is the understanding of how to determine the
marked to market value (simply the market value hereafter) of these positions and how the
marked to market value may change as the market environment changes. In other words,
measurements of value as well as risk of derivatives positions are necessary. To underscore the
importance of and the need for risk measurement, Merton and Bodie (1995, p. 8-10) write,
“To facilitate measurement, financial accounting must undergo fundamental revisions in the
long run... central to those revisions is the creation of a specialized new branch dealing with
risk accounting. Until a system of risk accounting is in place, truly effective regulation will be
difficult to implement.” (italics added)
Of course, it will be desirable to maintain consistency between measurements of value and
risk which calls for a unified treatment of market value and risk of derivatives. For derivatives
such as futures and options, there are well-developed valuation models in the finance literature
for this purpose. For swaps, much has been done about their valuation when they originate.
This includes the literature that deals with the pricing of the credit risks of the counterparties of a
swap arrangement. In comparison, to our knowledge, there is no unified theoretical exposition
on the determination of the market value and the interest rate or market risk of previously
established swap positions
5. One probable reason is the similarity of the fixed-for-floating swaps
4 If the market value of the banks’ swap positions were, say, $200 billion (10% of $2 trillion notional), it
will mean a liability of $200 billion for the banks if the market situation has moved in an adverse fashion
for the banks. A meagre 5% fall in the value of these swaps will drain the banks’ market value equity by
$10 billion.3
to coupon bonds or alternatively to a set of interest rate forward contracts. However, as noted
by Litzenberger (1992, p. 831),  “.. there is more to these plain vanilla swaps than first meets the
eye.”
In this paper, we propose a theoretical model for the market value and the interest rate risk of
existing or previously established swap positions. As in most theoretical treatments of interest
rate contingent claims, our building block is the term structure of interest rates on default-free
zero coupon bonds. We incorporate important pricing features of the secondary swap market in
deriving the relevant cashflows which are then discounted using the term structure of interest
rates to arrive at the market value of an existing swap position. This approach can be
implemented easily and provides important insights into the valuation of existing swap positions.
For example, the market value of an existing swap position is shown to be related to the value of
a reference coupon bond with a fixed coupon rate and unit face value. The coupon rate of this
reference coupon bond, however, varies depending on whether the swap position is that of a
fixed rate payer or receiver.
Since interest rate swaps are interest rate contingent contracts, their market values are
detemined, in equilibrium, ultimately by the same fundamental economic variables or parameters
that determine the term structure of interest rates. We explore these important links using the
one-factor general equilibrium term structure model of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985). Despite
some limitations and the development of other arbitrage-free models, this model, commonly
known as the CIR model, is the most widely used equilibrium valuation model of interest rate
contingent securities. Besides examining the equilibrium valuation of existing swap positions,
use of the CIR model also allows us to derive a dynamic measure of interest rate risk for the
existing swap positions that is similar to the stochastic duration measure of Cox, Ingersoll, and
Ross (1979) for coupon bonds and the quasi stochastic duration measure of Chen, Park, and
5 There is a growing practice in the industry of marking to market the existing swap positions.
Other than Litzenberger (1992), we are not aware of any rigorous discussion about the theoretical
basis of the industry practice. Litzenberger, however, emphasizes the role of the unique treatment
of swaps under default events in explaining why the industry practice is not sensitive to credit risk
and why swap spreads show relatively low cyclical variability.4
Wei (1986) for bond futures. This results in a unified theoretical treatment of the market value
and risk of previously established swap positions.
The theoretical valuation and dynamic risk measurement framework developed in this paper
can be useful from a practical point of view in several regards. First, our framework can be
applied to evaluate the adequacy of current disclosure requirements with respect to swap
positions of firms in general and the financial institutions in particular. For example, banks are
currently required to report the replacement value of their aggregate swap positions which may
be different from the market value of those positions. This may lead to a distorted picture of a
bank’s capital adequacy. Second, early warning signals to detect severe erosion in equity and
excessive risk exposure can be put in place using our framework. The dynamic risk measure
derived in this paper should be particularly useful in tracking the risk exposure in a changing
market. Third, the constructs of our paper can be applied to establish proper hedge by firms
wanting to hedge their swap positions or other term structure-sensitive assets or liabilities. In the
same vein, the establishment and management of an internal policy of specific risk exposure
targeting, such as a target stochastic duration, can be facilitated using our results. Fourth, since
we use a general (equilibrium) framework for interest rate contingent claims, the market value
and risk of economic transactions that are either equivalent or close in nature to swap positions,
e.g., parallel loans, can be measured and analyzed using a common framework. Such attempts
will be in the spirit of functional regulation or similar regulatory treatment of economically
equivalent transactions advocated by Merton and Bodie (1995).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we develop models for
determining the market values of previously established swap positions to the counterparties.
Equilibrium valuation of existing swap positions using the CIR model is then discussed in
Section II. In Section III, we address the interest rate risk of existing swap positions and derive
a dynamic measure of this risk. Some methods in swap management are briefly discussed in
Section IV. We conclude the paper in Section V.5
I. The Market Values of Swap Positions
By market convention, the fixed-rate payer that has a long swap position in a fixed/floating
interest rate swap is called the taker or buyer of the swap, while the floating-rate payer that has a
short swap position in the fixed/floating interest rate swap is called the provider or seller of the
swap. The fixed-rate payer and the floating-rate payer of an interest rate swap are called the
counterparties of the swap.
At the date of contract initiation of a fixed/floating interest rate swap, the swap contract is
usually executed at-the-money and the counterparties are said to have positions in a par value
(or at-the-money or at-market) swap because there is no initial cash exchange between the two
counterparties. Thus, at the date of contract initiation, an interest rate swap contract is neither
an asset nor a liability to either counterparty. However, subsequent to its initial date of
agreement, any market interest rate movements can cause the market value of a swap contract to
become positive to one counterparty and negative to other counterparty. For instance, a fall in
the market prices of the fixed/floating interest rate swaps (expressed in terms of the fixed rate of
interest on a swap) will make the existing swap contract a liability to the counterparty with a
long swap position (i.e., the fixed-rate payer in the swap) and an asset to the counterparty with a
short swap position (i.e., the floating-rate payer in the swap). Conversely, a rise in the market
prices of the fixed/floating interest rate swaps will bring a gain to the counterparty with a long
swap position (the buyer) and a loss to the counterparty with a short swap position (the seller).
Financial managers should be able to determine at any time the market values of the individual
swap contracts held by their firms, if they want to manage the swap positions of their firms in a
prudent fashion. In the following, we shall develop and discuss models for determining the
market values of existing long and short swap positions.
A. Notation
To determine the market values of an existing fixed/floating interest rate swap to its






the notional principal of the swap;
= T - t, the remaining number of semiannual periods to the maturity of the swap,
also known as the tenor of the swap when the swap is originated where T is the
original maturity date of the swap and t is the swap evaluation date
6;
the price at time t of a default-free unit discount (zero coupon) bond that matures at
time t+j, where j is measured in semiannual periods;
the m -period par value Treasury bond at time t implied by the zero coupon yield
curve
7;
the original fixed rate of interest (BEY type) on the swap;
the dealer’s bid price (also known as pay rate) of the m -period swap at time t; it is the
fixed-rate (BEY type) of an at-the money swap when dealer pays the fixed rate;
the dealer’s ask price (also known as receive rate) of the m -period swap at time t; it is
the fixed-rate (BEY type) of an at-the money swap when dealer receives the fixed
rate
8;
the market value of an existing swap with m periods to maturity to the long- swap-
position-holder (the buyer) at time t;
the market value of an existing swap with m periods to maturity to the short- swap-
position-holder (the seller) at time t.
6 To simplify our derivations, we assume t to be a reset date for the swap.
7 The r(m,t) calculated in this manner implies absence of coupon stripping or synthetic coupon
arbitrage opportunity. However, it is some times argued that the zero coupon bonds are less liquid
than the underlying Treasury coupon bond from which the zeros are stripped off. Thus, according
to this argument, the yield on the par value coupon bond implied by the zeros is an inaccurate
(over) estimate of the coupon bond if it were to directly trade at par.
8 In reality, there may be many dealers making market in a given type of swap and their bid and ask
quotations may vary albeit by small amounts. For our analysis, the dealer is taken to be an average
dealer.7
The actual process of determination of the swap dealer’s bid and ask prices is outlined in
Appendix A. Without loss of generality, we can express the bid and ask prices in the following
manner:
ib(m,t) = r(m,t) + db(m,t), and
ia(m,t) = r(m,t) + da(m,t),
where db(m,t) and da(m,t) are dealer’s bid and ask swap spreads. In general, the swap spreads
can be functions of the term structure and thus can be an additional source of variation in the bid
and ask prices as the interest rate situation changes in the market. This indirect effect of changes
in Treasury market yields is however quite small compared to the direct effect through r(m,t)
since the spreads themselves are quite small relative to r(m,t). Hence we assume in what follows
that the spreads do not depend on the Treasury yields. We, however, allow the spreads to vary
with the time to maturity of the swap, m, as is the case in reality.
As was noted earlier, r(m,t) is the BEY of m-period par value Treasury bond implied by the
term structure of zeros and as such its use is in the spirit of arbitrage-free valuation approaches
used in the industry. One added benefit of using the above construct is that the coupon rate of a
par value Treasury security is equal to its BEY. As we shall see later, this feature simplifies our
analysis of market value and risk of swap positions. Further, term structure models are needed to
evaluate the market risk of existing swap positions and most well-known theoretical models of
the term structure of interest rates offer explicit solutions for P(j,t)’s. The chosen r(m,t)-based
construct for swap bid and ask prices allows one to explore with ease the effect of the
parameters of term structure models on the market value and risk of existing swap positions.
Our focus in this paper is on the market value and risk of swap positions that were initiated
earlier. Hence we treat ib and ia (i.e., the spread parameters db and da) as given to us. In
particular, we do not directly analyze the effects that the credit risk and the demand and supply
of swaps have on the determination of ib and ia. and thus on the market value and risk of existing
swap positions. This approach for the valuation of existing swap positions is reasonable given the
size and liquidity of today’s swap market. In today’s market a firm can unwind its existing swap8
position without any noticeable impact on the market price (ib and ia). As such the firm can be
treated as a price-taker in the context of valuing its existing swap positions.
B. The Market Value of An Existing Swap Position
Most of the existing fixed/floating interest rate swaps, especially those with more active
floating indices such as LIBOR and T-bill rates, can be readily traded in the secondary markets.
The market value of an existing interest rate swap position is the dealer’s evaluation of the lump
sum value of the particular swap position at a given time. More specifically, the market value of
an existing swap position is the lump sum dollar amount the dealer must receive or pay to be
indifferent between stepping into the existing swap position or taking the same side in a new at-
the-money swap
9.
If the swap buyer wishes to unwind the long position prematurely at time t, she may ask the
a notional principal of W for m semiannual periods. The dealer’s current bid price is ib(m,t), that
is if the dealer takes the long side in a new at-the-money swap, she is willing to pay fixed at the
rate of ib(m,t) /2 semiannually against 6-month LIBOR flat for m semiannual periods. Thus if the
dealer takes over the swap buyer’s existing long position instead of taking the long side in a new
m semiannual periods. In general, the incremental cashflow stream will be an inflow (outflow) to
the dealer if the interest rates have risen (fallen) since the time of the existing swap’s origination.
Ignoring credit risk, the incremental cashflow stream to the dealer is certain since it does not
depend on the floating rate. Taking over the swap buyer’s position instead of taking the long
side in a new at-the-money swap is like buying (short selling, if incremental cashflow is
of the swap buyer’s position to the dealer is equal to the value of this portfolio of unit discount
bonds. At the margin, the swap dealer will be indifferent between taking the long side of a new
9 This is essentially the same as the ISDA Code’s “agreement value.”9
at-the-money swap and taking over the swap buyer’s existing long swap position and pay to
(receive from, if incremental cashflow is negative) the swap buyer the value of the discount bond
portfolio. The signed value of the discount bond portfolio is thus indeed the market value of the
swap buyer’s existing long position:
(1)
Using equation (l), a swap buyer can easily calculate the market value of her position by
simply observing the dealer’s bid price and the current term structure or the market prices of the
the m- period par value Treasury Bond’s semiannual yield to maturity as the single interest rate,
(falling) yield curve, the approximation will lead to an underestimation (overestimation) of the
magnitude of LS(m,t). This is because r(m,t) is greater (less) than the yield to maturity on just
the coupon stream of a par value bond when the yield curve is rising (falling)
11. The size of the
approximation error increases with swap maturity and the absolute value of the yield curve slope.
Caution is also warranted, especially in a rising yield curve situation, in using ib(m,t) as the single
discount rate to value the incremental cashflow stream of the swap position since by construction
it is also a yield to maturity on a coupon bond (and not just the coupons) like r(m,t). 
12
At any given point in time, an existing long swap position is of positive (an asset) or negative
(a liability) market value to the swap buyer depending on whether ib(m,t) is greater than or less
money to the swap buyer, and the buyer has gained from holding a long position in the swap
10 Strictly speaking, one would use either the bid price or the ask price of the zeros depending on the
sign of the differential cashflow.
11 For example, when the semiannual yields are 0.03 and 0.05 for 6-month and l-year maturity zeros,
r(2,0)/2 is 0.0495 while the semiannual yield to maturity on just the coupons of the par value bond is
0.0430. This leads to an underestimation of the value of coupons by about 0.9%.
12 The industry practice (Marshall and Bansal, 1992, p.432) of marking swap positions to market
using zero coupon swaps curve implied by par value or at-market swaps curve is also questionable.
Appendix B contains a brief discussion of the industry practice and its limitations.10
transaction. If LS(m,t) < 0, the swap is said to be out-of-the-money (i.e., the “underwater”
swap) to the swap buyer, and the buyer has lost from the swap transaction.
Using arguments similar to the valuation of an existing long position, the market value of the
swap seller’s existing short position can be derived as:
(2)
In this case, the swap dealer’s incremental cashflow from taking over the swap seller’s
an inflow (outflow) to the dealer if the interest rates have fallen (risen) since the time of the
existing swap’s origination. Taking over the swap seller’s position instead of taking the short
side in a new at-the-money swap is like buying (short selling, if incremental cashflow is
of the swap seller’s position to the dealer is equal to the value of this portfolio of unit discount
bonds. At the margin, the swap dealer will be indifferent between taking the short side of a new
at-the-money swap and taking over the swap seller’s existing short swap position and pay to
(receive from, if incremental cashflow is negative) the swap seller the value of the discount bond
portfolio.
An existing short swap position is of positive (an asset) or negative (a liability) market value
position is of positive value, SS(m,t) > 0, the swap is said to be in-the-money  to the swap seller,
and the seller has gained from holding a short position in the swap transaction. If SS(m,t) < 0,
the swap is said to be out-of-the-money  (i.e., the “underwater”  swap) to the swap seller, and the
seller has lost from the swap transaction. At any point in time t, if an existing swap is in-the-
money to its buyer, it will be usually out-of-the-money to its seller, and vice versa.
Note that the magnitudes of the market values of an existing long position and an existing
what the swap dealer hopes to capture by making the market in swaps:11
(3)
Let us now illustrate how to determine the market values of an existing fixed/floating interest
rate swap to its counterparties. Assume that the Bank has on its book a long (short) position in
a fixed/floating interest rate swap with Counterparty A (B). The terms of the existing swap and
the corresponding swap payment schedule for the bank are shown below
The current market conditions show that the dealer’s bid swap price, ib(6,t), is 6.30%, which
is the sum of the yield, r(6,t), on the 3-year par value Treasury Bond of 6% and the dealer’s bid12
spread db(6,t), for the 3-year swap of 30 basis points. Also, the dealer’s ask swap price, ia(6,t),
is 6.40%, which is 40 basis points for the ask spread,  ia(6,t), for a 3-year swap plus the 3-year
par value Treasury Bond yield of 6%. The incremental cashflow to the dealer of the bank’s long
position in the existing swap is -$60,000 {= $10 million x [(6.30% - 7.50%)/2]} per semiannual
period for the next three years. At the currently observed periodic-specific BEY’s on the zeros,
bank’s existing long swap position is -$324,705.
The incremental cashflow to the dealer of Counterparty A's existing short swap position is
$55,000 {= $10 million x [(7.50% - 6.40%)/2]} per semiannual period for the next three years.
Using equation (2), the current market value of Counterparty A’s existing short swap position is
$297,646. While the swap was at-the-money  at origination (no cash changed hands), the bank’s
long position has since gone under water and Counterparty A’s short position has become in-
the-money. The difference, $27,059, in the market values of the Bank’s long position and
Counterparty A’s short position is the value (at the current yield curve for zeros) of the swap
dealer’s spread of 5 basis points ((40 bp -30 bp)/2) on $10 million notional for 6 semiannual
periods. The swap dealer can capture this value if both the Bank and Counterparty A unwind
their respective positions through the dealer.
The current market value of the Bank’s existing short position (vis-à-vis Counterparty B) is
$324,705, which is the value (at the current yield curve) of the incremental cashflow of $60,000
{=$10 million x [(7.60% - 6.40%)2]} for 6 semiannual periods to the dealer. Counterpart B’s
existing long position has an incremental cashflow of -$65,000 {= $10 million x [(6.30% -
7.60%)/2]} and is valued at $351,763. The difference of $27,058 in value once again belongs to
the swap dealer if the Bank and Counterparty B unwind their respective positions through the
dealer.
The changes in the market value of the Bank’s two positions (long with Counterparty A and
short with Counterparty B) offset each other. If the Bank itself is the swap dealer in question and
the two counterparties decide to unwind their respective positions, the Bank will pay
Counterparty A $297,646 and receive $351,763 from Counterparty B as lump sums. These13
transactions will leave the Bank (as a swap dealer) with $54,117 and all of its swap positions
closed. To dispose of its long position with Counterparty A, the Bank had to pay $324,705 to
another dealer, but being the swap dealer itself, the Bank is getting away with paying
Counterparty A $297,646. Similarly, the Bank would have received only $324,705 if its short
position with Counterparty B was sold to another dealer, but it is now receiving $351,763 from
Counterparty B. As a swap dealer, the Bank has thus picked up the value of 5 basis points
(semiannual basis) swap spread from each of A and B. However, the net gain is actually only 5
basis points (semiannual basis) since in the process the Bank’s original fixed rate spread of 5
basis points (semiannual basis) has been lost. This original spread would also have been lost if the
Bank decided to unwind its positions through another dealer with no net payment to the dealer.
C. The Determinants of the Market Value of An Existing Swap Position
To gain more insights into the determinants of the market value of swap positions, let us
substitute for ib(m,t) in equation (1) and express the value of an existing long position in terms of
the value of a coupon bond:
(la),
(lb).
Substituting for ia(m,t) in equation (2), we can express the value of an existing short position
in terms of the value of a different coupon bond:
SS(m,t) = W [Bs(m,t) - 1] (2a),
(2b).
BS(m,t) is the price of an m -period coupon bond with unit face value and semiannual coupon14
reference coupon bonds.
Equations (1a), (lb), (2a), and (2b) confirm the common knowledge that a long (short) swap
position behaves like a short (long) position in a coupon bond. These equations, however,
clearly specify that the related coupon bond is not the same for the long and the short positions
in the presence of swap dealer’s spreads. The specific terms of these related bonds and more
importantly the pricing structure of these bonds are delineated in these equations. As shown in
these questions, the broad determinants of the prices of these related bonds and hence the
market values of the existing swap positions per dollar of notional principal are the following: (I)
da(m,t); (iii) the remaining time to maturity of the swap, m; and (iv) the term structure of interest
rates or discount bond prices, P(j,t)’s, j=1,2, ..,m.
(higher) market value of an existing long (short) swap position. The effect of the dealer’s
spreads are also apparent. Larger spreads decrease the value of both reference coupon bonds,
B/L(m,t) and BS(m,t), and hence leads to a higher (lower) market value of an existing long (short)
market values of existing swap positions through their effect on the coupon rates of the related
hypothetical bonds, CL(m,t) and CS(m,t).
swap. Part of the time variation in the spreads is predictable and the other part is stochastic. The
predictable part arises from the real life observation that both the bid spread, db(m,t), and the ask
spread da(m,t), usually increase with swap maturity. As the swap gets closer to its maturity, the
spreads will decline leading to an increase in the value of both reference coupon bonds, B/L(m,t)
and BS(m,t), by increasing their coupon rates, CL(m,t) and CS(m,t). The predictable time variation
of the spreads thus works against (in favor of) the holder of the long (short) position.15
The spreads may experience stochastic variations over the life of a swap to the extent the
swap dealers adjust their spreads in response to changing demand and supply conditions in the
swap market
13. This will introduce some random variations in the coupon rates of the related
hypothetical bonds as time passes. For two reasons, however, we do not address the random
variation of the spreads. First, the predominant source of the random variation in the spreads is
the changing demand and supply conditions in the swap market, which are in turn largely
induced by unanticipated movements in the term structure of interest rates. We are of course
going to discuss the effect of the stochastic variations in the term structure on the market value
and risk of swap positions. Second, the spreads are much smaller in size compared to the original
impact on the coupons of the two hypothetical bonds and thus on the market value and risk of
the swap positions
14.
Other than the minor effect of time to maturity, m, via the spreads, its primary impact on the
market value of the swap positions is intertwined with the effect of the term structure of interest
rates. Specific comments about these effects can only be made in the context of a given term
structure model of which the finance literature has many.
A close link of the market value of swap positions to the term structure is expected given that
the interest rate swaps are after all interest rate derivatives with multiperiod cashflows. Looking
at the valuation equations (1) and (2), it may first appear that the only role of the term structure
13 The creditworthiness of the counterparties may also change in an unanticipated fashion over the
life of the swap and hence may contribute to the (ex ante) random variation of the spreads. In this
paper, however, we do not analyze the effect of the credit risk on the market value of swap
positions. Hull (1989), Cooper and Mello (1991), Duffie and Huang (1996), and Sun and Wang
(1996), among others, analyze the effect of credit risk on swap pricing.
14 In case the credit situation of a counterpart deteriorates substantially and no informed dealer will
take over the swap position of the other counterparty, the spread becomes infinite theoretically
speaking. Common knowledge has it that both the primary and the secondary swap markets
operate more on an availability basis than on a price discrimination basis when it comes to credit
risk.16
constant multiperiod cashflow of an existing swap position. It is also tempting to ignore this role
of the term structure and use the dealer’s current bid or ask price as the single discount rate in
the traditional annuity factor formula. However, we have mentioned earlier the obvious
systematic error in valuation that results from using the bid or ask price or even the par value
coupon bond’s yield to maturity as the single discount rate. Thus the discounting role of the term
structure should be preserved. No less important is the role of the term structure in determining
the bid and the ask prices. These prices are determined on the basis of the par value coupon
bond’s yield to maturity which itself is contrived from the term structure. When the term
structure changes, two things happen: the incremental cashflow stream of a swap position
changes (the bid and the ask prices change as the par value coupon bond’s yield to maturity
changes), and the value of the incremental cashflow stream changes (the annuity factor changes).
These two changes are not necessarily in the same direction.
While the currently observed term structure is enough to price the existing swap positions, a
term structure model serves several useful purposes. First, the economywide factors and
parameters that determine the term structure and its movement are the ultimate determinants of
the market value and risk of swap positions. A term structure model allows us to explore the
influence of these ultimate determinants on the market value of swap positions. Second, the
market risk of swap positions arise from unanticipated movements in the term structure. A term
structure model permits us to describe the stochastic evolution of swap positions as a function of
the fundamental uncertainties in an economy and to derive a stochastic market risk measure.
Third, what effect the time to maturity has on a swap position’s value depends on the term
structure dynamics. A term structure model can help predict the effect of swap’s time to
maturity. Last, a swap portfolio may comprise of swap positions of varying maturities and there
is no natural choice for a single yield measure as a determinant of the market value and risk of
the swap portfolio. A (one factor) term structure model can provide such an yield measure.
The benefits of a term structure model are to be weighed against the costs which are not
clear. The main limitation is not knowing for sure which term structure model best captures the
features of term structure movements in reality. As a result, the predictions of a term structure17
model are always conditional on its ability to describe term structure movements in reality.
Unfortunately, there is no apparent solution to this dilemma and it is unlikely there will ever be
one
15. Therefore, the usual caveat applies to our discussions based on a specific term structure
model.
II. Equilibrium Term Structure Theory and
The Effects on the Market Value of Swap Positions
The finance literature is rich with term structure models
16. In this paper, we use the one-factor
general equilibrium term structure model of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985), widely known as
the CIR model. This section starts with a brief presentation of the CIR model. This is followed
by a discussion of the effects of the spot interest rate, the time to maturity of the swap position,
and the equilibrium valuation parameters on the value of long and short swap positions.
A. The CIR Model
The CIR model has been extensively used in the literature to value interest rate contingent
claims. Some key advantages of the CIR model are: (a) it implies non-negative interest rates; (b)
interest rate volatility is heteroskedastic conditional on the interest rate level; (c) the full effect of
a shift in the term structure on a portfolio of zeros can be captured since yields on all maturities
are allowed to be stochastic, an important feature for swaps; (d) since the market price of risk is
obtained as part of the equilibrium, the CIR model avoids internal inconsistencies and arbitrage
opportunities; and (e) the basic one-factor CIR model can be easily extended to the case of two
15 Practitioners and regulators have been toiling with a similar dilemma in using value at risk (VAR)
as a measure of market risk of involvements in derivatives (Reed, 1995). Apparently, the VAR of
an institution depends on the specific models that are used for valuing the the derivatives. There is
no uniform industry standards for such models and the regulators are equally reluctant to impose
such standards.
16 See Rogers (1995) for an interesting recent review of the well known term structure models.18
(Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985), Longstaff and Schwartz (1992)) or more factors (Chen and
Scott (1995)) and thus can be adapted to fit multiple points on the initial term structure using the
approach of Hull and White (1990)
17.
In the one-factor CIR model, the instantaneous default-free rate, r(t), alternatively referred to
as the spot rate or the short rate, is the instrumental variable for the underlying single state
variable that captures the fundamental stochastic characteristics of an economy. The dynamics
of the spot rate is given by:
(4)
square root model of interest rate, the process in equation (4) is a continuous time first-order
autoregressive process where the randomly moving spot rate is pulled toward its stationary
The time t equilibrium price of a j -period (matures at t+j) default-free unit discount bond in
the CIR model is given by:
(5)
where
as a preference or risk premium parameter since the instantaneous expected return on a bond is
17 See Longstaff (1993, footnote 3, p. 29) for the limitations of exactly fitting the whole initial term
structure.19
bond price with respect to the spot rate, r(t), and the expression in parenthesis is the spot rate
elasticity of the discount bond price.
The equilibrium term structure in terms of the yields to maturity on the unit discount bonds of
various maturities, or the equilibrium yield curve, is given by:
(6)
the yield curve is humped. The yield curve is monotonically increasing in the spot rate, r(t). For
small increases (decreases) in the spot rate, the yield curve shifts up (down) in a non-parallel
fashion as the change is greater for shorter maturities.
As shown by equations (5) and (6), the determinants of the equilibrium bond prices and the
is a function of the equilibrium term structure or the set of equilibrium discount bond prices,
P(j,t)’s 
18. Hence the spot rate, its stationary mean and its instantaneous variance, the risk
premium parameter, and the speed of adjustment parameter are the economy-wide or
fundamental determinants of the equilibrium market value of swap positions. In what follows,
we assume that the observed yield curve or the set of discount bond prices is always at the
equilibrium level, which however changes over time. We, therefore, omit the adjective
equilibrium in referring to the term structure or the market value of swap positions.
18 The equilibrium term structure is completely specified by the equilibrium discount bond prices.
Hence, we use the terms yield curve or discount bond prices interchangeably in referring to the
term structure.20
B. Effect of the Spot Rate?
Of the fundamental determinants, the key one is the spot rate, r(t), which contains all the
value-relevant information about the current state of the economy in the one-factor CIR model.
Since the whole yield curve is a (monotonically increasing) function of the spot rate, the market
values of all swap positions, irrespective of their maturity, depend on this single interest rate
alone. Albeit the par value coupon bond’s yield to maturity will vary across swap positions, but
all these par value yields are determined by the current spot rate alone.
Let us now see how the market value of an existing long swap position LS(m,t) , is related to
the current spot rate, r(t). In our one-factor CIR model, discount bond price of any maturity in
price of the reference coupon bond, B/L(m,t), in equation (lb), is also a decreasing convex
function of the spot rate. Therefore, according to equation (la), the market value of an existing
long swap position, LS(m,t), is an increasing concave (LS,(m,t)>0, LSrr(m,t)<0) function of the
spot rate, r(t). It can be shown that the par value coupon bond’s yield to maturity is increasing in
the spot rate (rr(m,t)>0), and therefore, LS(m,t) is increasing in r(m,t). These results will hold for
any one-factor term structure model where the discount bond price is a decreasing convex
function of the spot rate for all maturities
19.
The direct relationship between the spot rate and the market value of an existing long swap
position is in fact the net result of two opposing influences. Looking at equation (l), when the
spot rate changes,
in the spot rate, the par value coupon bond’s yield to maturity, r(m,t), goes up leading to an
increase in the bid price, ib(m,t). This enhances the constant incremental cashflow to the dealer
19 Two well-known examples of such one-factor term structure models are Vasicek (1977) and
Dothan (1978). This result, however, may not hold universally in a two-factor model. As shown by
Longstaff and Schwartz (1992), in a two-factor CIR model where the instantaneous variance of the
spot rate is the second factor, the price of longer maturity discount bonds may be increasing in the
spot rate.21
and hence an increase in the value of an existing
annuity factor. Let us call this the coupon effect.
valuable. Let us call this the discounting effect.
To recapitulate, when the spot rate goes up, the
long swap position using the old (pre-change)




to the dealer goes up
but the stream is less valuable. The positive coupon effect, however, dominates the negative
discounting effect of an increase in the spot rate leading to the net effect of an increase in the
market value of an existing long swap position. The intuitive reason behind this is that when the
spot rate changes, the yield to maturity on the par value coupon bond changes more than the
yield to maturity on the annuity of just the coupon stream. At higher levels of the spot rate and
thus yield to maturity, the differential between the yields to maturity of the coupon bond and the
coupon annuity narrows in a relative sense. This is at the source of concavity of the relationship
between the spot rate and the market value of an existing long swap position
20.
If we plot the market value of an existing long swap position, LS(m,t), as a function of the
spot rate, r(t), the steepness or slope of the function will indicate the magnitude of the effect of a
spot rate change. A key determinant of the magnitude of the spot rate effect is the swap
position’s time to maturity, m. To illustrate this matter, we plot in Figure 1, the value of an
existing long swap position as a function of the spot rate for three different swap maturities, m =
1 (0.5 years), 8 (4.0 years), and 14 (7.0 years). The assumed values of the other parameters are:
Figure 1 shows that the function gets steeper as the swap maturity gets longer, that is the spot
rate effect is stronger for longer maturity swaps
21. This is because the positive coupon effect of
a spot rate increase is much more dominant relative to the negative discounting effect for longer
20 In equation (la), the netting out of the two effects lead to a short position in the hypothetical coupon bond
with a coupon rate that does not depend on the spot rate. Hence the well known decreasing convexity of a
coupon bond’s price lead to increasing concavity of the market value of an existing long position.
21 As expected, the functions are concave, although the degree of concavity is negligible given the
assumed parameter combination.22
maturity long swap positions (with the same original fixed rate). The economic intuition behind
this pattern is that the yield differential between the  par value coupon bond and the coupon
annuity is relatively more for longer maturity bonds in sloped yield curve situations. When the
spot rate increases, yields to maturity on both par value coupon bond and coupon annuity
increase for all maturities. However, the increase in the yield to maturity on par value coupon
bond relative to that on coupon annuity is greater when the maturity is longer, thus causing the
greater relative dominance of the coupon effect. Once again the net effect can be seen more
clearly in equations (la) and (lb). The price of the reference coupon bond with a constant
(unrelated to the spot rate) coupon is more responsive to the spot rate (or par value coupon
bond’s yield) for a longer maturity. This results in a greater responsiveness for longer maturity
existing long positions.
Using similar arguments, we find that the market value of an existing short position is a
decreasing convex function of the spot rate (or par value coupon bond’s yield to maturity). The
steepness effect of the swap maturity is similar to the case of a long position. In other words,
longer maturity short swap positions are more responsive to spot rate changes than shorter
maturity short swap positions.
The above discussion of the spot rate effect on the market value of existing swap positions
may come across as if it was the effect of a change in just one point on the yield curve or the
term structure. The careful reader will note that the spot rate effect is in fact the effect of a (non-
parallel) shift in the whole yield curve. This is because in our one-factor CIR model, when the
spot rate changes, it induces a change (in the same direction) in the yields on all maturities, with
the shorter maturity yields changing more than the longer maturity yields. We should also bear
in mind that the spot rate effect discussed above relates only to small changes in the spot rate; by
assumption, the spot rate follows a diffusion process without any jump. While a more general
model may be desirable, it is beyond the scope of this paper.23
C. Effect of Swap Maturity
While we have mentioned the influence of the swap’s time to maturity on the spot rate effect,
we should now look into the maturity effect by itself. To do so, we shall first describe the
stochastic processes for the reference coupon bonds.
follows the dynamics:
(7)





The price dynamics and the maturity derivative (negative of time derivative) above for a
equation (9) is negative. This is expected since the discount bond price approaches the par
expected growth in price is reduced resulting in a less negative maturity derivative. This is also
expected as the terminal boundary condition of price being equal to par value applies to coupon
bond too. The maturity derivative can become positive with a coupon large enough relative to
22 Alternatively, one can risk-adjust the drift of r and replace the expected rate of return on the bond by r.24
the equilibrium expected return on the bond. Thus, the sign of the maturity derivative depends on
For a given coupon rate, in general we would expect the (signed) maturity derivative of a
coupon bond to decrease with the spot rate and to be positive (negative) for small (large) values
of the spot rate. Thus, as the swap maturity, m, gets longer, we would expect the reference
coupon bond values, BL(m,t) and BS(m,t), to become larger (smaller) at low (high) levels of the
spot rate, r(t)
23. Hence, according to equation (la), we would expect the market value of
existing long swap position, LS(m,t), to be higher (lower) for longer maturity swaps at high
(low) levels of the spot rate. The market value of existing short swap position, SS(m,t), would
tend to be lower (higher) for longer maturity swaps at high (low) levels of the spot rate.
benchmark for high or low levels of r(t) is roughly the annual coupon rate on the reference
maturity long swap position to have a relatively lower (higher) value. This maturity effect can be
seen more clearly in Figure 2 where we plot the market values of long swap positions against
swap maturity (ranging from 6 months to 10 years) for three alternative levels (1%, 4%, 10.5%)
of the spot rate.
The above swap maturity effect implies, in general, that in-the-money (out-of-the-money)
long (short) swap positions will tend to decline (increase)  in market value as they approach
maturity. The opposite is true for out-of-the-money (in-the-money) long (short) swap positions.
This general type of swap maturity effect is similar to that usually found for the coupon bonds
that sell at discount or premium from their par value. An in-the-money (out-of-the-money)  swap
position is like a premium (discount) coupon bond, as is evident from equations (la) and (2a).
The intuitive reason behind this usual maturity effect is simple, it is namely the gravitational pull
toward the terminal boundary condition: bonds or swaps selling below or above par before
maturity will have to sell at par at maturity.
23 What is a low or a high level for the spot rate in this context depends on the parameter combination.25
In our one-factor CIR model, given the original fixed rate (or coupon for reference coupon
bond), the current level of the spot rate determines whether the swap position is in-the-money or
out-of-the-money (reference coupon bond being premium or discount). As such the level of the
spot rate is the key determinant of the direction of the swap maturity effect. It should be noted
determines whether the yield curve is rising, humped or falling. The general equilibrium pricing
At a low level of the spot rate, the term structure is most likely rising. If we compare two
maturities, m and m -1, usually the value of the shorter maturity zero coupon bond is greater,
that is, P(m-1,t)>P(m,t).  The value of the reference coupon bond’s face value hence increases by
P(m-1,t)-P(m,t) as the swap maturity gets shorter. However, the value of the reference coupon
is quite steep and/or the original fixed rate is very low, the lost coupon effect will dominate and
we shall see a positive (negative) swap maturity (time) effect. In other words, the longer
maturity long swap positions (reference coupon bonds) will be deeper-out-of-the-money  (at a
greater premium). If the spot rate does not change, this means that the market value of the long
swap position will monotonically approach the par value from below over time.
At a high level of the spot rate, the term structure is most likely falling. The direction of the
two effects will still be the same unless the yield curve is too steep. However, the face value
effect will dominate since the change in the value of the face amount (due to maturity change) is
substantial at high yields, and specially so for shorter maturity swaps. The net result is that the
longer maturity long swap positions (reference coupon bonds) will be deeper-in-the-money  (at a
greater discount). If the spot rate does not change, this means that the market value of the long
swap position will monotonically approach the par value from above over time.
It should be mentioned, however, that while the above pattern of maturity effect is usually the
case, it is by no means universal. It is possible to have a non-monotonic relationship between
24 We are ignoring here the effect of the bid spread differences for different maturities.26
swap maturity and the market value of an existing swap position. See, for example, the 1% spot
rate curve in Figure 3 and the 10.5% spot rate curve in Figure 4. The only assumption that is
different between these two figures and Figure 2 is that relating to the value of the risk premium
D. Effects of Other CIR Model Parameters
Lastly, in this section, we look at the effects
market value of an existing swap position. In the one-factor CIR model, the zero coupon bond
Consequently, the reference coupon bond prices, B/L(m,t) and BS(m,t),
The effect of the speed of mean reversion in the spot rate depends on whether the current
25 With a greater signed covariance of the equilibrium spot rate with the percentage change in
optimally invested wealth (the market portfolio), it is more likely that the zero coupon bonds will
be more valuable (lower yields) when wealth is low and hence, the marginal utility of wealth is
high.words, when the spot rate is relatively low, a slow reversion of the spot
mean is detrimental (beneficial) to the holder of an existing long (short)
27
rate to its long-term
swap position. The
opposite is the implication of slowly mean-reverting interest rates for the swap counterparties
when the current rates are high by historical standards.
III. Dynamic Interest Rate Risk of Swap Positions
Credit risk and interest rate or market risk are the two major types of risk inherent in an interest
rate swap position. In this section, some brief comments on the credit risk are followed by a
more detailed examination of the interest rate risk.
Since interest rate swaps are private contractual agreements between two counterparties, they
are of course subject to a credit or default risk: the counterpartymight not meet its interest
payment obligation. However, it should be pointed out that the credit risks in interest rate swaps
are relatively unimportant for two reasons. First, because entering into an interest rate swap
agreement is a voluntary market transaction performed by two counterparties, a counterparty’s
credit standing must be acceptable to the other counterparty If one counterparty’s credit
standing has not reached the par, then a letter of credit from a guarantor is usually required
before the signing of the swap contract. Secondly, an interest rate swap contract calls for a
periodic payment of the net amount of the difference between the fixed and the floating interests
on the notional principal. Thus, the amount that might be defaulted is relvely small in relation
to the notional amount of the interest-rate swap.28
As we have noted earlier, an interest rate swap has a zero market value to its counterparties
when the swap originates. However, a subsequent change in market interest rates can cause a
change in the market value of the swap contract, making the swap position an asset with positive
market value to one counterpartyand a liability with negative market value to the other
counterparty To the extent market interest rates change in a predictable fashion, it does not
pose a risk to the holder of a swap position since the induced changes in the market value of the
swap position are foreseen. It is the unanticipated or stochastic variations in the market interest
rates leading to variations in the value of a swap position that are at the source of the interest
rate or market risk of a swap position.
In the following, we derive a dynamic measure of interest rate risk for existing swap positions
using the framework of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1979). The behavior of this risk measure as it
relates to the swap-specific factors and the equilibrium valuation parameters of the one-factor
CIR model is then examined.
A. Dynamic Measure of Interest Rate Risk
If interest rates are stochastic, as they clearly are, all interest rate derivatives including zero
coupon bonds, coupon bonds, and swap positions are exposed to interest rate risk (unanticipated
change in their values). The relevant question is, therefore, how to make a meaningful cross-
sectional comparison of the interest rate risk of interest-rate derivatives in general and interest
rate swaps in particular. A well-known measure of the interest rate risk of a bond, in this
regard, is its Macaulay duration. However, the Macaulay duration is a valid measure of interest-
rate risk “.. only if the current spot rate and the yield on all bonds of all maturities change by an
equal amount, which is possible only with a flat yield curve” (Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1979),
p.53). As is well-known, Macaulay duration also allows only one-time change in the yield curve.
To address the limitations of the original Macaulay duration and subsequent variants closely
associated with it, Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1979) proposed a dynamic duration measure, called
the stochastic duration, in the context of continuous time term structure movements represented
by a one-factor term structure model. They illustrate the stochastic duration measure using the29
one-factor CIR model we have discussed earlier. Hence, the stochastic duration measure has
the added benefit of directly linking the stochastic variation of interest-rate contingent contracts
to the fundamental uncertainty in an economy. In this sense, the stochastic duration measure
may also be viewed as the systematic or market risk of an interest-rate contingent contract.
From equation (8b), we see that the square root of the diffusion coefficient of a bond (with or
without coupon) is proportional to the square root of the diffusion coefficient of the spot rate:
(8b)
by Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1979), this is the correct metric of risk in a stochastic interest rate
environment. If two bonds with different maturities and coupons have the same relative
variation measure, their diffusion coefficients will be equal meaning that their values will be
equally responsive to the stochastic variation of the spot rate (and thus the term structure in the
one-factor model). Since one of these two bonds can be a zero coupon bond, we can always
find a zero coupon bond of such a maturity that its relative variation is the same as the relative
variation of a coupon bond. The stochastic duration of a coupon bond is defined as the time to
maturity of a zero coupon bond that has the same relative variation (and thus the same diffusion
coefficient).
In the one-factor CIR model, the relative variation of a zero coupon bond is given as a
function of its time to maturity, j:
(10)
of a coupon bond to be X, then the stochastic duration at time t, SD(t), of the coupon bond can
be found by inverting equation (10):
(11)
duration of a zero coupon bond is thus its maturity by definition. Since H(j,t) is increasing in j, if
a coupon bond has a higher relative variation, its SD(t) will be higher as well meaning that the30
magnitude of its interest rate risk (measured by its diffusion coefficient) is also higher. Also note
that the stochastic duration measure of interest rate or market risk is truly dynamic and
stochastic. As a coupon bond matures, its value and relative variation change because of the
non-constant maturity effect and the stochastic evolution of the spot rate (and thus the term
structure), and so does its stochastic duration.
The reference coupon bonds that we used in valuing the swap positions provide the essential
gateway to apply the stochastic duration concept in deriving a dynamic and stochastic cross-
sectional interest rate or market risk measure of swap positions. For notational convenience, let
us normalize the notional principal of a swap position to one dollar. The stochastic differentials
of the market values are as follows (dropping the swap maturity and time subscripts):
(12)
(13)




Equations (14) and (15) are in fact expressions for the instantaneous standard deviations of
the relative change or rate of return of swap positions. Since the instantaneous standard
proper metric of relative risk of interest rate contingent claims is the relative variation. For
existing swap positions, the relative variations are:
(16)
(17)
The stochastic duration of the swap positions at time t can be defined as:
(18)
(19)31
To calculate the stochastic duration of a long swap position at time t, one will calculate the
relative variation from equation (16) and then simply use that relative variation value in
equation (18). For a short swap position, equations (17) and (19) will be used instead.
Several points should be noted about the relative variation and the stochastic duration
measures of interest rate risk for swap positions. First, the relative variation measures are not
defined if the swap positions are exactly at-the-money  (reference coupon bonds are at par).
This, however, does not mean that the risk of a swap position that is close to being at-the-money
is negligible. In fact, to the contrary, swap positions that are close to being at-the-money  are the
riskiest in proportional terms. Intuitively, this situation is like the behavior of the discount on a
zero coupon bond as it approaches maturity. The discount will be fairly small relative to the
price of the zero coupon bond which will be close to its face value. For a change in the interest
rate, the discount and the zero coupon bond price will always move by the same dollar
magnitude albeit in opposite directions. However, this same dollar variation will loom extremely
large as a proportion of the discount. Equations (la) and (2a) show that the market value of an
existing swap position is in fact like discount or premium over face value of the corresponding
reference coupon bond. Thus the size of the market value of an existing swap position is small
relative to the market value of the corresponding reference coupon bond, specially when the
latter is close to par, that is the swap position is close to being at-the-money.
In reality, existing (previously established) swap positions will rarely be exactly at-the-money.
So the aforementioned problem of dynamic risk measurement may not arise at all. In case it
does, one way to handle this measurement problem will be to assign a small nonzero value for
the swap position in calculating the relative variation measure. Our simulations show that the
relative variation of swaps that are close to being at-the-money are distinctively and substantially
large. Thus in a cross-sectional comparison and for hedging or other risk management purposes,
the exactly at-the-money swap positions can be classified in the riskiest category.32
of relative variation for which the stochastic duration measure is meaningful
26. There is no
guarantee that the relative variation of swap positions will be bounded by this ceiling. There are
two ways this problem can be handled. One way is to calculate the stochastic duration measures
using the foIlowing slightly modified versions of equations (18) and (19):
(20)
(21)
number, and A is a scaling factor for suitable presentation of the stochastic duration measures
27.
The use of equations (20) and (21) leaves the cross-sectional ranking of the dynamic risk of
swap positions intact. Hence equations (20) and (21) can be used without any qualification for
comparisons dealing with swaps alone. The stochastic duration measures from equations (20)
and (21) cannot, however, be used meaningfully for a comparison of swap positions to other
interest rate contingent claims including the zero coupon bonds. This is because the stochastic
duration values from equations (20) and (21) do not any more mean that the swap positions
have the same degree of interest rate risk as the zero coupon bonds of maturity equal to the
calculated stochastic duration values.
In a situation where the interest rate risk of swap positions are to be compared against other
interest rate contingent claims, an alternative will be to simply compare the unadjusted  relative
variation measures from equations (16) and (17) for swaps and the relative variation measures
of other claims. After all, relative variation is the proper metric of relative risk, its monotonic
transformation, the stochastic duration measure, is merely intended to represent the riskiness in
time units.
26 This point was previously noted by Chen, Park, and Wei (1986).
27 In simulations over many parameter combinations, we find reasonable values for U and A to be 100,000
and 1,000 respectively.33
Third, since the stochastic duration measure is a positive monotonic transformation of the
relative variation measure, the direction of effect of the various parameters or variables of
interest on the stochastic duration or interest rate risk can be observed from the relative
variation measure.
B. The Behavior of Relative Variation and Stochastic Duration
In this subsection, we first compare the dynamic interest rate risk of an existing swap position
to that of the reference coupon bond. The effects of the spot rate and the swap maturity on the
dynamic interest rate risk of an existing swap position are then discussed.For the sake of
brevity, we limit our discussion to the case of an existing long swap position.
B.1. Long swap position vs. reference coupon bond
Since plain vanilla swaps are commonly associated with same maturity coupon bonds and
since dealers quote swap prices as spreads over sam maturity on-the-run Treasury bonds, it is of
both theoretical and practical interest to compare the relative variation of an existing long swap
position and the corresponding reference coupon bond. The reference coupon bond’s maturity
is the same as the swap’s remaining time to maturity and its coupon rate (paid semiannually) is
equal to the swap’s original fixed rate less the swap bid spread.
For a given change in the spot rate, the percentage change in the long swap’s value is equal to
its relative variation times the change in the spot rate multiplied by 100. Table 1 presents the
percentage changes in the market values of the long swap and the corresponding reference
coupon bond for a change of 10 basis points in the spot rate for swap maturities ranging from 6
months to 10 years and for initial spot rate varying from 1% to 10%. To highlight the effect of
There are two noticeable features of Table 1. First, the long swap position’s variation
induced by an unanticipated change in the spot rate is at least a few times greater than the
reference coupon bond’s variation across all initial spot rate situations and all maturities. The
reference coupon bond’s value changes by less than 1% for a change of 10 basis points in the34
spot rate in all the scenarios in Table 1. In comparison, the long swap’s value changes by more
than l% in all cases and by 9% or more for spot rates between 4% to 6%. The latter group
represents scenarios where the long swap is close to being at-the-money. While we do not
report the short swap results here, the percentage changes in a short swap’s value are marginally
greater than the long swap figures in Table 1. These results clearly indicate how volatile the
plain vanilla swap positions are compared to the coupon bonds. Even a very short maturity, say
1 year, swap position is much more volatile than a 10 year coupon bond.
Second, while the relative variation of the reference coupon bond varies marginally with the
initial spot rate and a bit more so with maturity, the relative variation of a swap position can be
significantly different depending on both the spot rate and the swap maturity. The reason behind
the lack of sensitivity of the reference coupon bond’s relative variation to the initial spot rate is
that H(j,t)’s, the relative variations of zero coupon bonds, are all independent of the spot rate,
r(t), in the one-factor CIR model. When the spot rate changes, the relative weights of the
cashflows of various maturities change somewhat and this produces only a minor impact on the
relative variation of the coupon bond. For the swap position, an additional effect of the spot
rate change is that the constant size of the incremental cashflow changes as the par value (not the
hypothetical) coupon bond’s bond-equivalent yield to maturity changes. As we noted earlier in
this paper, this cashflow effect is quite dominant for swap positions. This is a distinct risk
characteristic of swap positions compared to their coupon bond counterparts.
B.2. Spot rate and long swap’s relative variation
Let us now examine the nature of relationship between the spot rate, r, and the relative
variation, RVLS, of an existing long swap position. Differentiating RVLS with respect to r and
rearranging, we find that the direction of the relationship depends on:
This is the difference between the proportionate or relative change in the absolute first partial
of the long swap value and the relative change in the absolute value of the long swap. If the
relative change in the absolute first partial of the long swap value exceeds (falls short of) the35
relative change in the absolute value of the long swap, an increase in the spot rate will enhance
(reduce) the relative variation and stochastic duration of a long swap position of a given
maturity. The relative changes in question depend on the level of the spot rate and the swap
maturity in a complicated fashion.
To illustrate the relationship between the spot rate and the relative variation and stochastic
duration, we present in Figure 5 the DIFFr for a 50 basis point change in the spot rate and the
for three swap maturities (1 year, 5 year, and 10 year). While the magnitudes vary, the pattern of
the relationship between the spot rate and DIFFr and stochastic duration is the same across all
three maturities. The stochastic duration increases (declines) as the spot rate goes up when
DIFFr is positive (negative), that is, when relative change in the absolute first partial of the long
swap value exceeds (falls short of) relative change in the  absolute value of the long swap.
Roughly speaking, DIFFr is positive (negative) when the long swap is out-of-the-money (in-the-
money). In other words, the relative interest rate risk of an existing long swap position is an
increasing function of the spot rate for out-of-the-money swaps and is a decreasing function of
the spot rate for in-the-money  swaps. Swaps that are close to being at-the-money carry the
greatest interest rate risk.
As we saw in Figure 1, there is no pronounced curvature in the relationship between the spot
rate and the long swap value. Since the long swap value is a monotonic positive function of the
spot rate, the absolute value and the signed value of the first partial with respect to the spot rate
are the same. For a given maturity, the first partial does not vary a lot as the spot rate changes.
The change in the first partial as a proportion of itself is small and varies only marginally as the
spot rate changes.
The nonlinear relationships that we see in Figure 5 are primarily driven by the relative change
in the absolute value of the long swap. While the value of the long swap is monotonic increasing
in the spot rate, its absolute value is not. When the swap is out-of-the-money, its absolute value
28 U and A were set to 100,000 and 1,000 respectively.36
in fact decreases with an increase in the spot rate. In absolute terms, the first partial of the
absolute value of the long swap is the same as the first partial of the long swap value, and
accordingly shows minor variations only. However, the absolute value of the swap is quite high
when it is deep out-of-the-money  and continues to fall as the swap approaches the at-the-money
point. Accordingly, the relatively constant first partial of the absolute value of the long swap
steadily increases as a proportion of the absolute value of the long swap. Once the swap
becomes in-the-money,  the absolute value of the swap starts increasing and this leads to a falling
first partial as a proportion of the absolute value of the swap. The transition between the rising
and falling stochastic duration regions is not smooth due to the fact the relative variation is not
defined for an exactly at-the-money  swap. Also, the absolute value of the swap has a kink at the
exactly at-the-money point.
One implication of the pattern in Figure 5 is that swaps that are out-of-the-money or in-the-
money by the same amount have similar interest rate or market risks. This contrasts with the
commonly held view among regulators and practitioners that the holder of an in-the-money swap
has more to lose. This view is usually based on the notion that the interest rate movements that
have proved to be ble to one side of the swap mean potential distress for the other side of the
swap and hence an increased possibility of default by the latter party. Our analysis shows that
too much emphasis on the default risk of existing swaps may seriously distort the relative market
or interest rate risk of swaps. The holder of an existing out-of-the-money swap position has as
much to lose from adverse interest rate movements as the holder of a swap position that is in-
the-money by the same amount. Also, close to at-the-money  positions which may appear neutral
at first glance are the most susceptible to unanticipated variations in the market interest rate
situation or the term structure of interest rates.37
B.3. Swap maturity and long swap’s relative variation
We shall now examine the nature of relationship between the swap maturity, m, and the
relative variation, RVLS, of an existing long swap position. Differentiating RVLS with respect to
This is the difference between the relative change in the absolute first partial (with respect to
the spot rate) of the long swap value and the relative change in the absolute value of the long
swap, both relative changes occurring as the swap maturityincreases. If the relative change in
the absolute first partial of the long swap value exceeds (falls short of) the relative change in the
absolute value of the long swap, a longer maturity swap position will have a greater (smaller)
relative variation and stochastic duration at a given spot rate level.
To illustrate the relationship between the swap maturity and the relative variation and
stochastic duration, we present in Figure 6 the DIFFm for a 0.5 year or 6 month change in the
swap maturity and the adjusted stochastic duration, H
1(rvLS)
29, of a long swap position as a
function of the swap maturity for three spot rate levels (1%, 4%, and 10.5%). The relationship is
markedly different across the three spot rate levels.
At the 1% level of the spot rate, DIFFm is positive for swaps up to 3.5 year maturity and the
interest rate risk increases with maturity over this range. Four year and longer maturity swaps
have a negative DIFFm and the interest rate risk declines with maturity over this range. The
minimum risk swap’s maturity is somewhere between 3.5 and 4 years
30. Both the first partial
with respect to the spot rate and the absolute value of the swap increases with swap maturity, as
can be seen in Figures l and 2. Both relative changes, on the other hand, are high at short
maturity and decline as the maturity gets longer. However, the relative change in the first partial
with respect to the spot rate outpaces (falls shy of) that in the absolute value of the swap when
the swap maturity is short (long).
29 U and A were set to 100,000 and 1,000 respectively.
30 By setting DIFFm = 0.0, the minimum risk swap maturity can be found numerically.38
At 4% level of the spot rate, the relative change in the first partial with respect to the spot rate
consistently falls shy of that in the absolute value of the swap over the entire maturity spectrum.
Accordingly, the interest rate risk is monotonic decreasing in swap maturity when the spot rate is
around 4%.
When the spot rate is quite high at 10.5%, a situation opposite to that of the low spot rate
obtains. Now, DIFFm is negative for swaps up to 6.0 year maturity and the interest rate risk
decreases with maturity over this range. Six and a half year and longer maturity swaps have a
positive DIFFm and the interest rate risk increases with maturity over this range. The minimum
risk swap’s maturity is somewhere between 6.0 and 6.5 years. This pattern is due to the fact that
the relative change in the first partial with respect to the spot rate falls shy of (outpaces) that in
the absolute value of the swap when the swap maturity is short (long).
One difference between the low and the high spot rate situations is that the first partial with
respect to the spot rate is relatively high when the spot rate is low. This helps the high relative
change in the first partial with respect to the spot rate over short maturity range to outweigh the
relative change in the absolute value of the swap in a low spot rate situation. As the first partial
with respect to the spot rate gets smaller with higher spot rates, the high relative change in the
absolute value of the swap over short maturity range takes over in higher spot rate environments.
This contributes to the reciprocal interest rate risk patterns in low and high interest rate
environments.
One key insight from our analysis is that longer maturity swaps are not necessarily riskier than
shorter maturity swaps with identical fixed rates. The interest rate risk vs. maturity profile of
existing swap positions depends critically on the current level of the spot rate. As the spot rate
(and hence the term structure) evolves stochastically, the interest rate or market risk structure of
different maturity swaps may completely reverse itself. This underscores the distinction between
swaps and bonds as well as the need for dynamic measurement of the market risk of swaps.39
IV. Secondary Markets and Swap Management
31
The secondary swap markets are now very active, and they provide a great deal of liquidity to
swap participants. This was due to the formation of the International Swap Dealers Association
(ISDA) and the publication of the ISDA Code of Swaps which standardized some technical
aspects of swap transactions in 1985. The round lot transaction for interest rate swaps has now
decreased to as little as $5 million in notional amount. Now the major swap dealers themselves
trade with the interested parties and warehouse a large numbers of interest rate swap contracts in
order to avoid having to search for matching counterparties at any point in time.
Entering into a swap agreement in the primary swap markets is similar to a portfolio selection
decision, while making a swap position adjustment in the secondary swap markets is similar to a
portfolio revision decision. As the circumstances which originally give rise to an interest rate
swap change, the counterparties of the swap will find it beneficial or even necessary to unwind
that swap. For example, a counterparty may desire to unwind a swap because of (1) changes in
its balance sheet that alter its needs to hedge the asset/liability mismatch; (2) changes in the
future interest rate expectation that lead to remove the interest rate protection with a swap
position, and (3) a desire to recognize profit or loss from the swap position and to reflect that
profit or loss in the current period. A counterparty can unwind a swap position with one of the
three major types of interest rate swap transactions in the secondary markets: (1) the swap
reversal; (2) the swap termination; and (3) the swap assignment.
(1) Swap Reversal
In an interest rate swap reversal, the holder (long or short position) of the original swap
simply executes a new interest rate swap that is opposite to the original one. For example, a
bank with a long swap position can enter into a new interest rate swap agreement with a third
31 Various methods for swap management are discussed and illustrated in details in Chen and Millon
(1989).40
party under which it will pay the floating-rate of the same index and receive the fixed-rate of
interest payments determined by the current swap market prices. Therefore, the net result of a
swap reversal for the counterparty with a long swap position will incur a net cash inflow of
(W/2)[ib(m,t) - i0] per semiannual period for the next m semiannual periods. The disadvantages
of the swap reversal are: (i) it does not generally involve an immediate lump sum payment
representing profit or loss from the swap transaction, and (ii) it does not eliminate credit
exposure to a given counterparty. If the swap reversal is completed with an new counterparty,
the credit exposure has increased.
(2) Swap Termination Or Closeout
A swap termination or closeout is different from a swap reversal in that all the obligations
under the existing swap are extinguished upon the swap termination or closeout. A swap
termination is completed upon a cash settlement between the two counterparties of the swap
equal to an amount at which the counterparties of the swap are indifferent to staying in the
existing swap or entering into a new par value swap. As we have seen earlier, the market value
of a swap to its buyer is LS(m,t) and the market value of the swap to its seller is SS(m,t), at time
t. Thus, the acceptable amount of cash settlement for a swap termination should fall between the
absolute values of the above two market values of the swap position to its buyer and its seller.
(3) Swap Assignment
In a swap termination, a counterparty of the swap obtains a termination by paying or
receiving the swap buyout price from the other counterparty of the original swap contract. As a
result of swap termination, neither party has any further obligations in the swap after the cash
settlement is made and the termination is completed. However, in a swap assignment, a cash
payment is made to a third party and the original swap agreement remains intact for one
counterparty with a new counterparty stepping into the assignor’s position. It should be noted
that virtually all swap contracts require a consent of the counterparty on the assignment and the
acceptance of the credit of the assignee.41
V. Conclusions
In this paper we have developed models for determining     the market values of a long swap
position as well as a short swap position to its counterparties. The market values of existing
(previously established) swap positions are shown to be functions of swap-specific factors that
include the relative sizes and the different remaining maturities of the swap contracts, the original
fixed interest rates, and the current market prices for the par value swaps with the same
maturities. Using the general equilibrium term structure model of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross
(1985), we have explored how the values of the swap positions are related to the market factors
or the parameters of the equilibrium interest rate process. Following Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross
(1979), we have also shown how to measure the interest rate or market risk of an existing swap
position. This risk measure is dynamic in the sense that it changes over time as a function of the
stochastic evolution of the spot rate and the term structure of interest rates. Additionally, we
have discussed some methods for swap management.
Our models of market value (marked to market value) and market (interest rate) risk are
mutually consistent and thus offer a unified framework for a value cum risk accounting method
for swaps. This framework is also general enough to be applicable to other functionally
equivalent transactions of a firm. The valuation and risk measurement framework of this paper
should thus help the development of a more effective reporting and regulatory system for
derivatives transactions as suggested by Merton and Bodie (1995).
The market value and risk of interest rate swaps are intimately linked to those
magnitudes for Treasury securities as indicated by the market convention of quoting the swap
prices as spreads over the corresponding maturity Treasury yields. However, our analysis
indicates important differences between the values and the interest rate risks of bonds and
existing swap positions. The value of a swap position is shown to be the discount or premium,
as the case may be, from the face value (equal to the notional principal of swap) of a reference
coupon bond. Thus the swap positions behave like the discount or premium rather than the price
itself of a coupon bond. The importance of this difference is clearly visible in the behavior of the42
interest rate risk. The simulation results of this paper show that the interest rate risk of a swap
position is substantially greater than that of the same maturity coupon bond. Swap positions that
are closer to being at-the-money seem to carry the greatest interest rate risk. The interest rate
risk diminishes as the swap position becomes either deeper out-of-the-money or deeper in-the-
money. Unlike coupon bonds and contrary to our initial perceptions, we find that the shorter
maturity swaps can often exhibit greater volatility to unanticipated interest rate variations than
the longer maturity ones. Thus, as noted by Litzenberger (1992, p.831), indeed “.. there is
more to these plain vanilla swaps than first meets the eye.”
Much work remains to be done in this area. In a separate paper, we are pursuing the
disclosure and regulatory implications of the results in this paper. The sensitivity of the results
that rely upon the one-factor CIR model need to be looked into under alternative term structure
assumptions. Analyses of more complex swaps, e.g., differential swaps, amortizing swaps, etc.,
and swap derivatives are expected to reveal more intricacies and perhaps surprises in terms of
their relationship to bonds. In this paper, we have ignored the effect of time varying credit risk
on the stochastic variations of the swap positions by treating the current term structure of swap
spreads as given and constant. The importance of this assumption can be investigated. Given
data availability, this paper’s predictions regarding the market value and risk of existing swap
positions may also be empirically tested.43
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Appendix A: Determination of Dealer’s Quotes on Swap Prices
By market convention, dealer’s bid and ask prices are quoted as spreads over the bond
recently issued) Treasury security
a swap dealer’s quote for 5-year (m = 10) fixed-for-floating swap may be like T+ 45 -  T+41,
which means the swap dealer is willing to receive (pay) a fixed rate for 5 years at the current
BEY on the 5-year on-the-run Treasury note plus 45 (41) basis points against paying (receiving)
the floating 6-month LIBOR flat. If the current BEY on 5-year on-the-run Treasury note,
While the dealers quote their bid and ask prices as spreads over the BEY of on-the-run
Treasury security, these prices are first arrived at by subtracting and adding spreads over what is
called the swap midrate, rmid(m,t):
To continue our example, the swap midrate, rmid(m,t),
and added to arrive at the quoted bid and ask prices of ib = 0.0741 and ia = 0.0745 respectively.
32 With the massive growth in the swap market and increased competition among dealers, the bid
spread and the ask spread over Treasury have declined overtime. The market-making spread (ask-
bid) of the dealer has also narrowed over the years and is now typically less than 10 basis points.
See the recent study of Brooks and Malhotra (1994).
33 See Marshall and Kapner (1993) for industry practices in the swap market.To calculate the swap midrate, rmid(m,t), dealers typically employ arbitrage-free valuation
approach. For short-dated (maturity less than 2 years) fixed-for-floating swaps, dealers generally
use the forward LIBOR rates implied by the Eurodollar strip (strip of Eurodollar futures
contracts), to calculate the no-arbitrage fixed rate, i.e., the swap midrate 
34. The rationale is that
the dealer can hedge the floating LIBOR exposure (pay or receive) by taking appropriate
position in the Eurodollar strip.
Whether short-dated or long-dated dealers can also hedge their unmatched swap positions by
taking appropriate positions in the Treasury securities, cash and/or futures. For example, if the
dealer is paying fixed rate (5-year Treasury+ 41 bp) on $25 million in exchange for 6-month
LIBOR flat, the dealer can hedge by short selling 6-month T. Bills of $25 million face value and
using the proceeds to buy 5-year Treasury. Any basis risk between T.Bill and Eurodollar
exposures can be hedged by taking a position in TED (T. Bill over Eurodollar) futures. Once the
match is found, the dealer can lift the hedge.
It should also be mentioned that while LIBOR is the most popular floating rate index, other
interest rates (e.g., T.Bill yield) are also used as the floating rate index in fixed-for-floating
swaps. In any case, the yields, explicit or implied, of the hedging vehicles (cash and/or futures)
relevant to dollar-denominated interest rate swaps are intimately related to the basic US interest
rates, namely the Treasury zero coupon yields or term structure of interest rates. As the term
structure changes, dealer’s bid and ask prices will change irrespective of which specific variant of
arbitrage valuation is used to set the swap midrate. Since we intend to analyze how market
conditions affect the value and risk of existing swap positions, it seems reasonable to directly
(rather than indirectly) link the bid and ask prices to the term structure of interest rates.
34 For some examples, see Bautista and Mahabir (1994) and Marshall and Kapner (1993, pp. 147-
154).49
Appendix B: Industry Practice of Marking to Market Swap Positions
The industry practice of marking to market existing swap positions is based upon a derived
yield curve for zero coupon swaps. A long position in a zero coupon swap involves a single
fixed rate payment at swap maturity against periodic floating rate receipts. As illustrated by
Marshall and Kappner (1993, pp. 147-154), dealers first calculate the future value of a
dollar for various maturities assuming repeated reinvestment at the implied Eurostrip rates
and then use these future values to calculate the implied zero coupon swap rates (fixed rates
of par value or at-market zero coupon swaps) for various maturities. The swap midrate for
a given maturity is then derived as the coupon rate that equates the notional principal to the
value of the coupons and the notional principal discounted at the implied zero coupon swap
rates. Thus the so-called zero coupon swaps curve implied by the par value swaps curve
takes us back to the zero coupon swap rates which are used to calculate the swap midrates.
First, if the zero coupon swap rates are applied to discount the incremental cashflow
stream to the dealer from taking over an existing swap position, as is the case with the
industry practice of marking to market, it is being assumed that the comparable opportunity
for the dealer is to invest the lumpsum (the value of the existing swap position) on a
rollover basis at the Eurostrip rates. Barring credit risk, the incremental cashflows are
certain and there is no apparent reason why the dealer and the swap participants should
prefer Eurodollar deposits (and the accompanying Eurodollar futures positions to lock in
future rates) over the Treasury zeros.
Second, as of now, Eurodollar futures contracts are available up to 5 years maturity
although the liquidity for longer maturity contracts is not as high as for the shorter maturity
contracts. Thus longer maturity swaps cannot be priced using Eurostrip rates. One also has
to take into account the marking to market implications. Further, Eurostrip rates may not be
quite appropriate for swap contracts with floating rate index tied to T. Bill yield or some
other U.S. interest rate.50
Third, the implied zero coupon swap rates are not directly investible rates. If dealers do
not use the Euro-strip-based zero coupon swap rates in calculating the swap midrates, it is
not clear what type of comparable investment opportunity they mean for the dealer or the
swap counterparties.
Fourth, if there is variation in how the dealers arrive at the swap midrates, their implied
zero coupon swap rates may vary even if their midrates are the same. Thus it is possible that
a swap counterparty may get different estimates of the market value of her position from
different dealers. This confusion can be avoided if the observable yields on Treasury zeros
are used to mark to market the swap positions.
Lastly, when it comes to the evaluation of the market risk of swap positions, it is rather
convenient to use the zero coupon bonds than some implied zero coupon swap rates, as we
shall see later in this paper. The zero coupon bond approach thus provides a relatively
direct, coherent, and easy-to-implement unified framework for the evaluation of the market
value and risk of existing swap positions.Figure 1
The market value, LS(m,t),  of an existing long swap position with a notional principal of
$100 and maturity m at time t, as a function of the spot rate, r(t). The parameter values
Figure 2
The market value,  LS(m,t), of an existing long swap position with a notional principal of
$100, at time t, as a function of the swap maturity, m, for alternative levels of the spotFigure 3
The market value, LS(m,t),  of an existing long swap position with a notional principal of
$100, at time t, as a function of the swap maturity, m, for alternative levels of the spot
and db(m,t)=d b-0.0012.
Figure 4
The market value, LS(m,t),  of an existing long swap position with a notional principal of
$100, at time t, as a function of the swap maturity, m, for alternative levels of the spotFigure 5
The adjusted stochastic duration of an existing long swap position with a notional
principal of $100, at time t, and the relative change in the absolute value of the first partial
(with respect to the spot rate) of long swap value minus the relative change in the absolute
value of long swap, both as a function of the spot rate, r(t), for alternative levels of the
swap maturity, m. The relative changes are for a change of 0.005 in the spot rate,  r(t). TheTable 1
Percentage changes in the value of a long swap position and the corresponding reference
coupon bond for a change of 10 basis points in the spot rate from its initial level, r(t).  The
notional principal of the long swap and the face value of the coupon bond are both setTable 1 Continued
Percentage changes in the value of a long swap position and the corresponding reference
coupon bond for a change of 10 basis points in the spot rate from its initial level,  r(t). The
notional principal of the long swap and the face value of the coupon bond are both set
equal to $1. The parameter